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Abstract 
This  paper  argues  that  information  about  the  value  of  the 
deposit-insurance  guarantee  is  available  from  market-generated  data.  Under 
certain assumptions,  an  unbiased  estimate  of the market  value  of  the  deposit 
guarantee  is readily available.  In practice,  however,  it is only possible  to 
observe  a  lower  bound  against  which  estimates  of deposi t-insurance premia  can 
be  compared. 
In  the  absence  of  deposit-insurance  reforms,  the  total  guarantee 
associated  with  federal  deposit  insurance  includes:  1  )  the  guarantee  on 
insured  deposits,  2)  a  conditional  guarantee  on  uninsured  deposits,  and  3)  a 
conditional  guarantee  of  the  stockholders'  residual  claim  on  the  future 
earnings of the bank. 
Introduction 
The  debate  on  pricing  deposit  insurance  has  gone  from  a  purely  academic 
concern  to  a public policy concern.  The  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation 
(19831,  the  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  (1983>,  and  the  U.S.  Treasury 
Department  (The  Working Group of the Cabinet  Council  on  Economic  Affairs  1985) 
have  all issued  reports on  risk-based deposit-insurance pricing.  These  execu- 
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deposit-insurance  pricing (see,  for example,  Avery,  Kawst,  and  Hanweck  119851; 
Horvitz  [19831;  Kane  [1983,  1985,  and  19861;  Merton  [1977,  19781;  Pyle  11983, 
19861;  Rochester  and  Walker  [19851;  and  Ronn  and  Verma  C19851). 
If  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC)  charges  a 
deposit-insurance  premium  equal  to  the  risk premium  the  market  would  require 
to  provide  the  same  level  of risk-bearing  services,  then  the  insurance  is 
appropriately  priced.'  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is to  show  (1)  that if 
unconditionally uninsured  depositors  exist,  the  market's  ex  ante  estimate  of 
the  fair value  of deposit  insurance  can  be  observed;  and  (2)  in  the absence of 
deposit-insurance  reforms,  the  deposit  insurance  guarantee  consists  of  the 
deposit  insurance  put on  the  insured deposits,  a  conditional  guarantee  on  the 
uninsured  deposits,  and  a  conditional  guarantee  of  the  stockholders'  residual 
claim on the future earnings of the bank. 
Section  I  of this  paper,  which  outlines  the  assumptions  used  in  the 
analysis,  shows  that if banks  are closed when  they are found to be  insolvent, 
and uninsured depositors and  stockholders bear  their full share  of  the  losses, 
then  the  fair value  of the  deposit  guarantee  on  $1  of insured deposits  is the 
risk  premium  paid  on  $1  of  uninsured  deposits.  Section  I1 relaxes  the 
assumption  that  the  FDIC  always  closes banks  that are found  to  be  insolvent at 
the time  of examination. '  With  FDIC  forbearances,  the  observed  risk premi  um 
on  $1  of uninsured  deposits  is a lower  bound  estimate of the fair value of the 
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example  showing  how  market  information  could  be  used  in calculating  the  fair 
value  of  the  deposit  guarantee.  The  paper's  conclusions  are  presented  in 
section IV. 
I.  The  Market  Value  of Deposit Guarantees  without FDIC Forbearances 
The  following assumptions  are used  in this analysis: 
1 )  Market  efficiency.  This  assumption  is  necessary  if  the  market 
participants  are  to provide  an  accurate  estimate  of the  risk of the 
bank.  The  semi-strong  form  of  the  eff  i  ci  ent-markets  hypothesi  s  and 
dissemination  of  adverse  information  regarding  insured  banks  is 
.  required for the analysis to  hold. 
2 >  The  absence  of external  social  benef i  ts associated  with  the  provi  sion 
of federal  deposit  insurance  at  the  margin.  If the  social  benefits 
associated  with  the  last  dollar  of deposit-insurance  coverage  exceed 
the  private  benefits  associated  with  the  last  dollar  of 
deposit-insurance  coverage,  then  the  market  premium  is  not  the 
social  ly optimal  deposi t-insurance  premi um  (see  Merri  ck  and  Saunders 
[19851>. 
3 >  A1 1  bank  1 iabi  1  i  ties are  homogeneous  deposit  1 iabi  1  i  ties.  The  bank  is 
assumed  to issue one  type  of deposit  that matures  on  the  same  day  the 
bank  is  examined  and  the  deposit  guarantee  is repriced.  This  is 
assumed  for expositional  simplicity.  All  that  is required  for  the 
analysis  to  hold  is  that  the  bank  issue  some  uninsured. deposit 
liabilities  that  mature  on  the  examination  date  (possibly  large 
negotiable CDs). 
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.  indivisibilities  in  the  deposit  and  insurance  markets  ensures  that 
arbitrage can  remove pricing  errors  when they occur.  The size of  the 
transaction  costs  and  the  indivisibilities  limits  the  degree  of 
pricing error that cannot be removed by arbitrage. 
5  1  No  FDIC forbearances.  The  F.DIC  closes all  banks  that  are insolvent. 
Stockholders of  banks  with  a positive  net worth  that  falls  below  the 
statutory (or  regulatory)  minimum  capital  requirements  are  given the 
option of increasing the capital  in  the  bank  or  a1  lowing  the  deposit 
guarantor  to  close  the  bank.  Banks  with  positive  net  worth  that 
exceeds the statutory  (or  regulatory)  minimum capital  requirements  are 
allowed  to pay  out the excess net worth to their stockholders.  This 
is a counterfactual  assumption.  It assumes  that  the  FDIC  is  capable 
of and  wi 11  ing  to close  banks  when  they  are found  to be  insolvent. 
Negative net worth is a necessary, but not a  sufficient, condition for 
the forced closing of  a bank by the FDIC.' 
The following notation is used throughout the paper: 
A  =  value of the bank's assets, 
B,  =  value of a $1  risk-free discount bond at time t, 
Dt  =  value of the bank's deposits at time t, 
C(*>  =  American call option, 
c(*)  =  European call option, 
D  =  the face value of D,  at t=T, 
p(*)  =  European put option. 
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deposi t-insurance  guarantee  equal s  the  total  value  of ri  sk-bear!  ng  services 
provided  in  the  market  by  uninsured  depositors  when  the  bank  issues  only 
uninsured  deposits.  Merton  (1977)  shows  that  with  100  percent  insurance  the 
value  of  the  deposit  guarantee  equals  the  European  put  option  p(A,T-t;D1, 
which  allows  the  stockholders  to sell  the  assets  of  the  bank,  A,  to  the 
depositors  for  the  face  value  of  their  deposits,  D,  at time  t=T.  Following 
Merton  (19741,  in the  absence  of the  deposit  guarantee,  the  total  value  of 
risk-bearing services provided by  the uninsured depositors  is, 
By  Merton's  (1973)  Theorem  6,  and  by  letting  Do/D  =  do and  AID  =  a,  the 
value  of  the  deposit  guarantee  (risk-bearing  services)  on  $1  of-  insured 
(uninsured)  deposits at t=O  is: 
The  result  in equation  (2)  has  little practical  use  in pricing deposit 
guarantees if it  only holds when  a1 1 of the  bank's  deposits  are  either  insured 
or  uninsured.  If  100  percent  of  the  banks  deposits  are  insured,  then 
Bo-do  cannot  be  observed.  If  the  uninsured  depositors  and  the  deposit 
guarantor  have  the  same  priority  of  claim  against  the  assets  of  the  bank, 
relaxing the assumption of full  or no  insurance  to allow for partial  insurance 
of the  bank's  deposits  does  not  affect  equation  (2).4  To  see  this,  let w, 
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The  stockholders  now  hold  two  put  options:  p(w,A,T-t;w,D>  issued  by  the 
FDIC  and  p(w,,A,T-t;w,,D>  issued  by  the  uninsured  depositors.  By  Merton's 
(1973)  Theorem  6,  the total value of the  stockholders'  put options at t=O  is: 
(3)  p(w,A,T;w,,D)  +  p(w,A,T;w,D> =  (w,+w,)p(A,T;D). 
By  definition,  w,+w,,  =  1.  Therefore,  a  bank  does  not  affect  the  value  of 
risk-bearing  services  provided  by  the  uninsured  depositors  (FDIC)  on  each 
dollar  of  uninsured  (insured)  deposits  by  issuing  w,D  insured  (w,,D 
uninsured)  deposits.  The  total  value  of  the  deposit  guarantee  is 
w,D(Bo-do). 
111.  The  Analysis  with Federal  Bailouts of  Insolvent Banks 
This  section  relaxes  assumption  5  of section I  by  assuming  that a  set  of 
constraints,  z,  exists  that  affects  the  FDIC's  ability  to close  insolvent- 
banks.  The  analysis  shows  that  with  FDIC  forbearances,  the  risk  premium 
paid  on  the  explicitly uninsured  deposits  is the  lower  bound  of the market's 
valuation of the deposit guarantee.  Furthermore,  the  cost of the  guarantee  is 
shown  to increase  when  the  stockholders'  position  in the  bank  is not  closed 
out when  the bank  is  found  to  be  insolvent. 
Let  q(z)  be  the  probability  that at the  next  examination  date the bank  is 
insolvent and  the  FDIC  is unable  to close  it.  Following  Kane  (1986>,  z  is 
assumed  to  be  a  single  index  function,  which  consist  of  information 
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and  political  and  legal  constraints on the  FDIC's ability to close insolvent 
banks.  If the insolvent  bank  is  allowed  to operate, the  FDIC  may  choose  to 
operate  it  as  a  mutual  institution (that  is, close  out  the  position of  the 
existing shareholders) or a1  low the equity  holders  to  retain  their  position. 
Initially, it is assumed that the equity holders are closed out. 
If  a  bank  is  found  to  be  ins~lvent,  both  the  FDIC  and  the  uninsured 
depositors  have  the  right  to force  the  closing  of  the  bank.  If the  FDIC 
wishes to a1  low the  bank  to operate  until  the  next  examination  day, it  must 
buy  out  the  position  of the  uninsured  depositors  or guarantee  value  of the 
uninsured  depositors'  claim  against  the  bank.  The  FDIC  must  provide  a 
guarantee of  at  least  the market value of  the uninsured depositors' claim on 
the  bank  at the  time of  examination  to  keep  the  uninsured  depositors  from 
forcing  a  liquidation  of the  bank.6  It  is  assumed  that  the  same  set  of 
constraints, z, that  prevents  the  FDIC from  closing  the  bank, forces  it  to 
guarantee the face val  ue of the uni  nsured depos  i ts. ' 
The value of  the  guarantee on $1  of  conditionally  uninsured  deposits  at 
t=O  is  q(z)p(a,T;l>.  The risk-bearing  services  provided  by  the conditionally 
uninsured depositors on  $1  of deposits at t=O is: 
The observed  risk premium on $1  of conditional  ly  uninsured  deposits  is  shown 
below in equation  (5): 
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observed  risk premium  on  the  conditionally  uninsured  deposits  scaled  by  1, 
minus  the  probability  that  the  FDIC  will protect  the  conditionally uninsured 
depositor  if the  bank  is  found  to be  insolvent.  The  total  value  of  the 
deposit-insurance subsidies  and  guarantees  is: 
(6)  G  =  wiD(B~-do) +  q(z>~,D(Bo-do). 
Because  q(z)  is not  observed,  the market's  estimate  of the  fair  value  of 
the  deposit  guarantee  cannot  be  observed.  However,  since q(z)  is less  than or 
equal  to 1,  the  risk  premium  paid  on  the  conditionally  uninsured  deposits 
represents  the  minimum  value  of  the  deposit-insurance  guarantee.  It is a 
lower  bound  that can  be  used  to  evaluate empirical  estimates  of the fair value 
of  the  deposit  guarantee.  The  upper  bound  of the  fair value  of the  deposit 
guarantee  would  be  reflected  in the  risk  premium  of  the  subordinated  debt 
issued by the bank. 
Equation  (6) assumes  that  the  stockholders'  position  is closed  out  when 
the  bank  is found  to be  insolvent.  Let  y(z)  be  the probability  that on  the 
next examination  day  the bank  is insolvent,  and  the  stockholders  retain their 
position  in  the  bank.  By  failing  to  always  close  out  the  stockholders' 
position  in insolvent  banks,  the  FDIC  has  changed  the  value  of  the  call 
option,  C,,  which  represents  the  equity  of  the  bank  and  is now  equal  to 
Max[y(z)C,,A-Dl.  The  value  of the  call  option  C,,  can  be  broken  down  into 
two  components:  the  value  of the equity without the deposit-insurance subsidy 
C,  =  Max(0,A-D>  and  the  deposit-insurance  subsidy  x  =  Max[y(z)C,,OI.  The 
total value of the deposit-insurance  subsidies  and  guarantees  at t=O  is  now: 
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assets  and  future  earnings  of  the  bank  increases  the  value  of  the  deposit 
guarantee. 
111.  Market  Estimates  of  the Deposit Guarantee 
To  demonstrate  how  market  information  can  be  used  in pricing  the  deposit 
guarantee,  the  yields  on  six-month  (secondary  market)  Treasury  bills,  bank 
certificates  of  deposit  (CDs),  and  prime  commercial  paper  (CP)  are 
collected.'  The  yields  are  the  daily  quoted  ones  reported  in the  Federal 
Reserve  Board's  statistical  release  H.15,  "Selected  Interest  Rates,"  for  the 
trading  day  closest  to January  1  and  July 1  for each  year  1980  through  1985. 
All reported yields are converted to bond-equivalent ones.  An  annual  yield is 
computed  for each  instrument  by  taking  the  geometric  average  of its six-month 
yield in  January and  July for that year. 
The  risk premium  on  CDs  (CP)  is calculated as  the  difference  between  the 
annual  yield on  CDs  '(cP)  and  T-bills.  'O  Assuming  10  percent  insurance  and 
different  values  of q(z>,  the  value of  the deposit guarantee  is  estimated from 
the  risk premium  on  the  CDs. "  By  equation  (5),  the  value  of the  guarantee 
on  $1  of  insured  deposits  is R-q.  The  value  of the  guarantee  on  $1 
of conditionally uninsured deposits  is  q(z)R,,/(1-q(z)). 
Table  1  presents  numerical  estimates  of  the value of the deposit guarantee 
on  $1  of insured  and  conditionally uninsured  deposits  for 1980  to 1985.  Two 
points are  brought  out  in the table.  First,  the value of the guarantee on  the 
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value  of the  deposit guarantee  on  insured and  conditionally uninsured  deposits 
varies across  years. If  q(z> is not  known,  then  the  observed  risk premium  on 
the  conditionally  uninsured  deposits  can  only  be  used  as  the  lower  bound 
against which  estimates  of the  deposit  guarantee  can  be  compared.  As  seen  in 
table 1,  the  degree  to which  the observed  lower  bound  can  be  used  to  fine-tune 
risk-based models  of deposit guarantees  decreases  as  q(z> increases. 
One  way  of  making  q(z)  observable  is to force  banks  to issue  discount 
bonds  that  can  be  insulated  from  the  deposit  guarantees. "  These  bonds 
would  have  the  same  maturity  as  the  deposit  insurance  put  and  the  same 
priority of claim on  the  bank  as  deposits.  The  risk premium  on  $1  of this 
debt  is  Rb  =  Bo-do.  The  value  of  the  deposit  guarantee  on  insured 
deposits  (BO-do)  is now  observable.  In addition,  q(z>  and  the  value  of 
the  guarantee  on  conditionally  uninsured  deposits  (q(z)(Bo-do)>  can  now  be 
computed  as: 
IV.  Conclusion 
The  market  provides  information  on  the  value  of deposit  guarantees.  Under 
restrictive assumptions,  the  value  of the deposit guarantee  is  observable.  In 
practice,  however,  only  a  lower  bound  can  be  observed.  Under  the  current 
system  of federal  deposit  insurance,  the deposit guarantee  consists of (1)  the 
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uninsured  deposits, and  (3) a  guarantee of  the stockholders' residual on the 
future earnings of  the  bank.  Because  the  guarantee  has  real  value  to the 
banks'  stockholders, insolvent banks  should always  be reorganized  in a  manner 
that closes out the position of the stockholders. 
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1.  For  purposes  of exposition,  this paper  concentrates  on  the  value  of FDIC 
guarantees.  The  analysis  is valid for all  three  federal  deposit  guarantors: 
the  FDIC,  the  Federal  Savings  and  Loan  Insurance  Corporation  (FSLIC),  and  the 
National Credit Union Share  Insurance Fund  (NCUSIF). 
2.  Legally,  the  FDIC  does  not  have  the  power  to close  insolvent  banks.  The 
FDIC  must  petition  the  bank's  chartering agency  to close  the  bank.  However, 
this process  is generally a  formality,  and,  in practice,  the  FDIC  is able  to 
force the closing of insolvent banks. 
3.  See  Kane  (1986)  for a discussion of the constraints  faced by  the FDIC  that 
may  prevent it  from closing insolvent banks. 
4.  Currently,  the  deposit  guarantee  is  explicitly  extended  to the  first 
$100,000  of each  deposit  account  (this  1  imi  t  is per  person,  per  account  type, 
at each  insured institution).  If the deposit guarantee  is not  extended  to the 
explicitly  uninsured  deposits,  the  statutory  guarantee  of  only  the  first 
$100,000  of any  deposit  does  not  affect  the  valuation  of the  portion of the 
deposit in  excess  of $100,000.  A  proof of this is  available from the author. 
5.  This  is assumed  for  expositional  simplicity.  The  analysis  is still valid 
in cases  where  the  purchase-and-assumption  method  is used  to dispose  of the 
bank  (and  any  other  technique  used  to handle  a  fai 1  ing  bank  that  leaves 
uninsured depositors whole). 
6.  It  does  not  matter  whether  the  FDIC  buys  out the  uninsured  depositors  and 
issues  insured  deposits  to replace  them,  or guarantees  the market  value of the 
uninsured deposits. 
7.  This  assumption  seems  to hold in practice.  Historically,  the  majority of 
failed banks  have  been  disposed  of  using the purchase-and-assumption  technique 
(see  Barnett, Horvitz,  and  Silverberg [19771>. 
8.  If the  bank  is not  required  to  pay  for  the  conditional  guarantee  on  its 
uninsured  deposits,  it receives  a  subsidy  from  the  FDIC  of q(z)(Bo-do>  on 
each  dollar of conditionally uninsured  deposits it issues.  Competition  among 
banks  for  conditionally  uninsured  deposits  might  result  in a  fraction,  v,, 
of  the  subsidy  being  paid  to the  conditionally  uninsured  depositors.  The 
observed  risk  premium  on  $1  of  conditionally  uninsured  deposits  is  R,  = 
(l-q(z>(l-~~))(Bo-do>. 
9.  For  expositional purposes,  it  is,assumed that x=O. 
10.  The  spread between  the T-bill rate and  the  CD  and  CP  rates  includes  a  tax 
differential  because  T-bills are  not  subject  to state and  local  taxes,  while 
CDs  and  CP  are.  This  makes  the  spreads  wider  than  the  true  risk-induced 
spread  and  biases  the deposit guarantee estimates upward. 
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on  insurance  coverage  is  $100,000,  and  the  majority of widely  traded  CDs  are 
of a  $1,000,000  denomination  (see  Stigum  [19781). 
12.  This,  of course,  assumes  that y(z)=O. 
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